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Why do aviation professionals come to Infoshare? Oftentimes, it is to share “lessons
learned” from our voluntary safety reporting programs – namely ASAP and FOQA.
This meeting has been a tremendous achievement and success over the decades,
starting with only a few dozen and growing into the robust group you see around you
today. A vibrant, positive safety culture predicated on a non-punitive, confidential
reporting system is likely a principal contributor to its success.
Specifically, operators may come to Infoshare to share data with the FAA, which in
turn grants their programs protections as outlined in Part 193. This has been
understood since Infoshare’s inception. However, a new threat looms on the horizon:
that of open-source aviation data being widely available to the public. On its own,
open-source data may seem innocuous—after all, isn’t this where the world is going?
And isn’t free good? In one manner, yes.
However, for us as aviation professionals, we need to rapidly come to terms with the
fact that this open-source bow wave is abruptly pushing up against existing
regulations (or lack thereof), as well the decades it has taken to build the just culture
that has made U.S. airlines the safest transport system in the world.
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Today, we would like to present to you an event that happened recently that brings to
light many of these issues. We hope to bring awareness to issues specific to this
event, but also longer-term questions we must address going forward as an industry
regarding data use and protection.
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The rise open-source flight data

Background of event

Overview of
Presentation

SFO ATC perspective

The pilot’s perspective

Future considerations
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ASAP

Safety
record since
WWII

FOQA
LOSA

ATSAP

Flight Safety Foundation, 2019

This graph is well known to anyone in aviation safety.
After a rise and plateau in accidents around 2000, voluntary safety programs were
memorialized in the U.S. It could be argued that the ASAP / FOQA / LOSA trifecta has
contributed to this reduction in accidents.
ATSAP came online in 2008, and has been a useful aid in tethering air traffic
controllers’ reports to pilots’ reports thought the Confidential Information Sharing
Program (CISP).
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Traditional flight
safety management
• ASAP as 3-legged stool
• FOQA data process highly
standardized
• LOSA observations
• SMS mandatory

Source: Scaled Analytics (public domain)

Our voluntary safety reporting programs have mostly stayed the same over the past
two decades. For example, most FOQA programs look like this.
Programs are standardized, data flow is understood across carriers, and safety
management is an internal process to the airline.
SMS becoming mandatory has further helped to align and standardize voluntary
safety programs across airlines.
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The rise open-source flight data

• “Flight data on a
stick”
• Threat:
Our programs lose
the ability to add
context and
validation to the data

With the ADS-B mandate of 2020 and its adoption worldwide, we have seen an
explosion of open-source data available. Flightradar24, Flightaware and other
websites have seen giant viewership increases and a monetization of premium
services.
Volunteer service providers have created a constellation of ADS-B receivers around
the earth, which feed into various repositories.
When this data is made public, it is often without any context that a professional
flight safety management system could offer. The public’s insatiable appetite for
immediate information has been partially fulfilled by this technology.
We witnessed it recently with a 737 accident in China, as well as during the two
Boeing MAX accidents. Lay analysis of flight data solely from ADS-B data was used to
form conclusions about these accidents in their immediate aftermath.
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Aireon ADS-B Satellite

ATC Metadata

ASDE-X

Look at all the sources of data we have today. And this is just a sample.
Most of these were once proprietary but are now open source.
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Flight data
available today…
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Position
Identification
Altitude
FPM
Groundspeed
Decibel level
ACARS
Mode control panel (Europe)
Airspeed *
Bank angle *
etc…

* derived

Many parameters that were once the domain of FOQA or FDM programs are now
available in the open-source environment. The column on the left lists many of these
parameters. Given adequate cross-referencing, it is conceivable that an airline could
run about 80% of its FOQA program outside of traditional internal methods.
Many think only the Europeans can “see” a mode control panel. Go to
adsbexchange.com and click on any aircraft in the world. You will see its real-time
mode control panel altitude setting under the FMS SEL parameter. Monitoring live
flight data parameters are now possible entirely outside of a FOQA program.
EANS in Europe is a real-time tracker of noise levels, identifying aircraft overflights by
tail number and recording associated decibel levels.
ACARS data is openly obtainable by off the shelf devices.
A recent study of looked at 832 emergency “squawk 7700” events. What did the
researchers use to “validate” if it was an emergency or not? Twitter.
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Background of event

Let’s now talk about an event that is available to us entirely from open-source data.
In December of 2021, a 767 was completing a transcon from JFK to SFO. The airport
was using an extremely rare configuration of the “10-10s” – landing on 10L using a
non-precision approach, and departing on 10R.
As you can see from the FlightAware track displayed, the approach (or approaches) of
this flight were anything but routine.
The flight enters from the upper right corner, makes left traffic for 10L, goes missed,
is vectored again for 10L, goes missed, and diverts to OAK.
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As it turns out, about one month after the flight, a member of the public obtained the
liveatc.net tapes and tethered them to the flight track. The video went viral,
amassing tens of thousands of hits in a matter of days.
Spoiler alert: the pilot you heard on the recording? That was me.
Now, let’s step back and take a look at the event itself. This flight revealed many
interesting things regarding ATC in relation to the airspace at SFO, as well as the local
practices we utilize at the facility.
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SFO ATC
Perspective
•
•
•
•

Background
STARS & Approaches
Runway Configurations
Go Around is not Always An MOR

• Missed Approaches

I discussed go around terminology at the last Infoshare in Pittsburgh. I spoke of
the go around versus cancel approach clearance availability, as well as go
around itself - published missed vs HDG/ALT. These are great discussion
pieces for cause and effect. And this event brought to light the need to look a
little deeper.
James reached out to NATCA Rep at SFO, and they asked me if I would
participate. My first thought surrounded the rarity of the operation that I have
seen 3 times in 22 years.
In the replay, “fly the published missed” came to be based on an interpretation
through NCT about when and where we can assign headings. We were briefed
that pilots were not aware of the need for feet per mile climb gradients on the
go around, but have briefed the published missed approach. Our updated LOA
limited what we could assign, and included different altitudes for the different
headings because of the MVA. My answer was to “fly the published missed” so
long as there are no traffic conflicts. This was taken to heart by some of my
co-workers, including the controller on this video.
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As we evolve with technology and navigation, events can occur where the
issues have not been fully addressed. On this flight’s go arounds, the MVA and
missed approach have not been addressed, as we rarely see the approach. The
Minimum Vectoring Altitude at 1,100 on the approach is very close to a 3,100
MVA segment. Assigning a heading to a missed approach could get us into a
pickle. That is where voluntary safety reporting programs come in. Reports
can surface these rare evets and systemic issues.
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STARS and approaches
ALWYS2 and WWAVS1 STARs do not connect to Runway
10L/R Approaches.

There are not STAR and approach alignments for the 10s. This is known to NCT and
will take time for publication. Procedures being published on 5/19/2022 were
agreed upon at a PBN meeting conducted in 2017. That is a 5-year lag for a
publishing change to take effect!
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Runway Configurations

The Runway configuration Chart
Let’s start by looking at the configuration trends for SFO.
The majority of the operation is 28-1 and 28-28
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SFO is a unique airport, in that it has parallel intersecting runways, and is usually
configured in using intersecting operations. The majority of arrivals come in on the
28s. This aids in noise abatement. When we land on the 10s, arrivals come from the
north on left traffic. There is rapidly rising terrain on this side.
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050

050

Here is a look at the boundaries of the finals sectors for the 10's, which are normally
combined as we are a single file arrivals to 10 Left and single file departures from 10
Right.
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Final sectors for
the 10s

Final sectors and how the airspace is aligned as depicted on the radar map.
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Minimum
Vectoring
Altitudes

Diverse Vectoring Area (DVA)
- Allows a controller to turn an aircraft below the MVA, considering the aircraft is
turning away from obstruction
- SIDs are designed for ft/NM (NOT ASSURED IF AIRCRAFT IS ON A HDG)
- From Nov-Feb, couldn’t depart simultaneously 28/1 because SID traffic had to
reach MVA 2,800 before the controller could turn them away from Oakland traffic
and there was not a crossing restriction for the departures off of 1 Left/Right to
separate from the 28 Left/Right departures climbing to 3,000.
- Not considered was the go around/missed approach against the 1 Left/Right
departure.
- “Published missed” solves 2 problems: 1. no new lateral/vertical guidance 2. met
climb gradient
- This was resolved in February, and we are operating as normal.
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Controller Reporting:
- Go-around and MOR
- “Turbojet Go Around Within 1/2 Mile Of Arrival Threshold”
- Not all are captured

- Go-around vs. missed approach
- “Cancel approach clearance” vs. “go around”
- Log entry

- What constitutes the reporting of a go around can skew
the numbers when looking for trending data. An example
is a three-mile final unstable approach. This is bridged by
the Confidential Information Share Program (CISP) where
we taxonomize for the go arounds that are otherwise
unknown. In many cases, log entries exist but are not
calculated. That is all there was for the go arounds from
this flight. The diversion goes into another realm of
notifications.
-

VMC vs. IMC
“Cancel” vs. “go around” at the facility / from looking at
CISP data / talked to procedures rep “Give me data”
Log entry
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-

-

-

When ATC says, “Don’t worry about it” should you
worry? That is the question I will attempt to answer
here today. Through the CISP, reviewing replays where
no other reporting match up exists, I reach out to the
controllers to educate on the effect of those words. In
the video here, had there been an ATC violation
identifiable in the communication between the
controller and pilot, there is a very good chance of it
becoming known. When people create these videos,
they love to add the date of occurrence. This becomes
a time stamp for reporting requirements. You can see
where this is going.
Possible PD or not? This notification, known as the “Brasher

Notification,” is intended to provide the involved flight crew with an opportunity
to make note of the occurrence and collect their thoughts for future
coordination with Flight Standards regarding enforcement actions or operator
training.

Does ATC know what went wrong? Not always. It does
take time to go back and listen to the replay to quantify
if it is in fact a possible pilot deviation or a controller(s)
issue.
- CISP perspective - we see trending that otherwise
would not be available to ATC unless through
know events, and still maybe not fully understood
at that point.
- Watching replays (trends, etc.) (controllers may not
watch replays as much as pilots) When I do reach
out to controllers to see if they go back and watch
a replay when something does not quite line up
during their session, the answer is generally no. It
is a new availability and needs to be put into
practice somehow. Which leads to...
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-

If a person takes the time to report, why not give
them the info? (controllers may not want
closure?) I provide a replay, MORs, log entries to
the ERCs I work with. That confirms for the crew
what occurred. This gives them the opportunity
for closure on the event and they can move
forward equipped how to deal with a similar
circumstance going forward.
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ATC’s Thoughts:
“Fly The Published Missed” vs Heading / Altitude
“Say reason for the go around”
90 transmission in 15 minutes

More work to be done on the go around events to substantiate whether there
are changes to be made. Keeping flexibility; Depends on circumstances /
building consistency = No brainer for controllers.
“Say reason for the go around” – might have to use for the MOR or hazard to flight for
the next approaching aircraft (windshear/ tailwind / equipment issue)
- NORCAL wants to know too if it is not obvious. We put out a SAFE Discussion
sheet on this
- 90 transmissions: 3 approaches
- Transmissions done to confirm what they know – NOVEL situation
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The Pilot’s Perspective
• “Published missed?”
• Mid-altitude go-around
• To TOGA or not to TOGA
• Number of ATC transmissions
• What actually went wrong?
• Try 3rd time?
• Selection of suitable alternate
• Return flight to SFO, likely same anomaly

Now you’ve heard the ATC perspective on the event. Here are some things from the
pilot perspective.
- “Fly the published missed” is often more complicated than heading & altitude
- Ask audience to raise hands with how many transmissions they heard. It was 90.
Aviate-navigate-communicate
- We told ATC many times to “standby.”
- Trained to go around with terrain warning. Everything seemed fine, on
airspeed/configuration, but were we missing something else? Expectation bias.
Had to break the expectation human factors bias. My initial reaction was to
“continue.”
- Should we try a 3rd time or divert? We chose to divert.
- Chose OAK because it was on the water = no terrain.
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Certainly, this exposed many interesting issues as far as ATC and aircraft.
Let’s step back and take a broader look at this event in the context of existing
protections of aviation data, and the open-source age were are entering.
In a coincidence of all coincidences, I had written an article for EUROCONTROL’s
Hindsight magazine regarding ADS-B, data use and pilot protection that was published
at the same time as this event. (And keeping in theme with the discussion, yes, my
article is open-source and freely available…) So, this topic is near and dear to my
heart, as I’m sure it is yours.
Let’s remind ourselves of what’s available open source and review the protections
currently in place.
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Protected

Not Protected

CFRs

Our collective bargaining agreements and regulations are all we have to protect us.
Think of the list on the right growing as new technology comes on line.
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Protected

Not protected
(available through FOIA)

• Contracts, MOUs and LOAs
• CFR Part 193 (voluntary information)
• CFR 13.401 (FOQA programs)

ATC tapes
FAA irregular reports
Video recordings at an airport
Radar data (short range)
Airmen certifications / medical
certificate status
• ASAP reports? (Comair 5191)
• ADS-B data
• …?
•
•
•
•
•

For many years the main discussion about FOQA was the potential use of data for
enforcement purposes, such as civil lawsuits that could establish liability against
pilots and carriers. Think of what goes on in many parts of the world, where an
accident is a criminal investigation and information is suppressed rather than shared.
In the U.S., the fear that the data would be available to the media, the litigants, and
the public under the Freedom of Information Act has driven was largely done away
with because of the data protections afforded to FOQA programs.
The FAA established the following rules about FOQA data disclosure after the union
of efforts by the FAA, the associations, and the airlines. However, we can see the list
on the right expanding and tipping the scale to the side of least protection.
Regarding the Comair Lexington crash in 2006, the court ruled that
no statutory or regulatory privilege prevented disclosure of Comair’s
ASAP reports, concluding that releasing ASAPs to the plaintiff was
acceptable because it was not a release to the “general public.” Only
a last-minute settlement stopped the release of Comair’s ASAP
reports, which would have severely wounded safety culture, just at
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the time ASAP programs were being formalized in the airlines.
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14 CFR Part 193
Protection of Voluntarily
Submitted Information
(a)

General. When the FAA issues an order designating information as
protected under this part, the FAA does not disclose the information
except as provided in this part.
(1) The information is provided voluntarily;
(2) The information is safety or security related;

(d) What if the FAA obtains from another source the same information I
submit? Only information received under a program under this part is
protected from disclosure under this part.

Information obtained by the FAA through another means is not
protected under this part.

All of us are aware of Part 193 and the protections it provides from disclosure,
keeping in mind the last sentence that says “information obtained through ‘another
means’ is not protected.”
So, this entire event happened outside of FOQA, was seen by tens of thousands of
people on YouTube, and literally “went viral” in the world of aviation. The good news
is that the event went textbook, and the overwhelming majority of comments to the
crew was positive. But what happens when an event doesn’t go so well? What if the
pilots’ identities became identified?
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Flight data
protections
only apply
to FOQA
programs

14 CFR 13.401
(e) Enforcement. Except for criminal or deliberate
acts, the Administrator will not use an operator's
FOQA data or aggregate FOQA data in an
enforcement action against that operator or its
employees when such FOQA data or aggregate FOQA
data is obtained from a FOQA program that is
approved by the Administrator.
(f) Disclosure. FOQA data and aggregate FOQA data,
if submitted in accordance with an order designating
the information as protected under part 193 of this
chapter, will be afforded the nondisclosure
protections of part 193 of this chapter.

Pertaining to flight data, protections against enforcement action against the company
or pilots is only afforded through an FAA-approved FOQA program. All the sources of
data you saw in previous slides is not protected from enforcement action.
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ALPA’s View On Data Protection
• Data Protection Working Group
• ALPA supports the use of devices that capture flight data for purposes of accident
and incident investigation by governmental accident investigation boards after
certain protections are in place (i.e., de-identification) to improve safety.
• The current protections in CBAs against misuse of safety data and information
recorded during operations for purposes of discipline, discharge, or proficiency
review or training varies.
• Airline employees have also become subject to decreased privacy and increased
methods of electronic monitoring in the workplace and off-duty, due to a
proliferation of technology.
• Existing CBAs should be examined and modified, as necessary and as
opportunities are presented, to incorporate expanded data protection provisions
against the use of non-consensual recordings for purposes of discipline,
discharge, or proficiency review or training.

ALPA has developed a Data Protection Working Group.
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Future Consideration #1 • Novel technology and uses
• Next generation of pilots will be comfortable monitoring personal
data – (FitBit, Apple watch, etc.)

fitbit Sense
fitbit dashboard

The next generation of pilots will be at ease with personal information being
monitored and catalogued.
We all know about FitBit and Apple Watches, but did you know the new Garmin
watch integrates those elements along with GPS position and color mapping and
connects to the avionics as well?
Viewing your flight data on your wrist is already a reality in general aviation.
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Garmin D2 watch
Garmin Connect app

Garmin’s new D2 watch integrates health monitoring, GPS and many other features
into its app.
But of course we are all aware of Garmin’s presence in the avionics industry.
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They may expect their aviation safety data to be immediate too

Garmin D2 watch

Garmin being Garmin, they have integrated flight data from the aircraft’s avionics into
the watch.
What could this look like on a personalized flight data dashboard?
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Consideration #2 – Flight data decentralized

Dashboards are available from many different open-source vendors that allow you to
set up notifications for flight events, very similar to how FOQA programs set
notification for flight safety events.
On the right, you can set FPM parameters and airspeed within a distance from an
airport. This is basically monitoring for unstabilized approaches, in this example.
Could an individual or company make their own “virtual” FOQA program with similar
exceedance triggers? It looks like that’s already possible.
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FOQA at your
fingertips
• Pilots able to see own
flight data without a
Gatekeeper
• Threats: Public’s ability
to see actual flight data
outside of NTSB
established procedures
• Social media threat
should video go viral
GE FlightPulse (public domain)

Products like GE’s FlightPulse are being introduced, and are great opportunity to
leverage both aggregate and individual data for pilot awareness, safety and efficiency.
However, this was not envisioned 20 years ago when the FOQA advisory circular was
drafted, and addressed only aggregate data that would be processed and used for the
purposes of the program.
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Threat #1

Consideration #3 –
Parallel Investigations
 Parallel investigations may increase
 Ease of ADS-B and open-source data
 Stress point of safety programs in the
past

Parallel investigations have caused stress on ASAP and FOQA programs in the past,
and has led to some programs being shut down for a period of time. The ease of
obtaining open-source data could make it much easier for bad actors to carry out
parallel investigations, making an end-around of our FOQA and ASAP programs that
we have worked so hard to establish trust in and create a just culture.
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RTO Scenario

Graphic:

(simulated data)

For example, we could immediately obtain ASDE-X / ADS-B data from an RTO without
the validation that is traditionally done through flight data programs.
This has the potential to put stress on ASAP programs, as the data could be
introduced into the Event Review Committee and conflict with the pilot’s ASAP
report. Here, a high-speed abort was indicated in the ADS-B data, but the pilot
reported a low-speed abort. What consequence does this have for maintenance?
Would the ERC consider it falsification?
If written letters of agreement don’t address this scenario and a just culture isn’t
promoted, this data could potentially be used to exclude a report. This scenario
would have a detrimental effect on our whole industry.
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Traditional safety management
• Aggregate data
• Labor as a stakeholder
• Memorialized agreements
• Information latency

The future?
• High profile events
• Decentralizing of data
• Information immediacy
• Rush to judgement?

A few miles to our west at St. Louis University sits a statue of the poet Robert Frost.
“Two roads diverged in a yellow wood.” That seems to be an appropriate metaphor
for where we are today. Our existing paradigm is being challenged by disruptive
technology.
We come from an era of aggregate data, formalized agreements, and a period of
latency for data to get processed, validated and interpreted by experts.
Because of our remarkable safety record, we now tend to focus on high profile
events. And when these happen, open-source data is even more irresistible because
it’s right there for the taking. Information immediacy may have a benefit, because it
may accelerate the necessity for wireless flight data upload capability.
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OpenSky Topics
• ADS-B Data Fusion
• Gate-to-gate Flight Analysis
• Collecting and annotating air-traffic
voice communication data
• Analyzing TCAS in the Real World
using Big Data
• Analysis of Go-Arounds in
Commercial Aviation Using ADS-B
Data

Let’s have a brief thought experiment.
Imagine there was a safety conference in St. Louis this week. They discuss things like
data fusion, TCAS events, and go-arounds. A room this size, attendees that look just
like us. Nice lanyards too. Sounds like an Infoshare, right?
However, instead of data coming internally from our protected flight safety programs,
it comes to us externally. And instead of the Rules of the Road, there is no road. It’s
all open prairie.

34

OpenSky Topics
• ADS-B Data Fusion
• Gate-to-gate Flight Analysis
• Collecting and annotating air-traffic
voice communication data
• Analyzing TCAS in the Real World
using Big Data
• Analysis of Go-Arounds in
Commercial Aviation Using ADS-B
Data

OpenSky Symposium
Zürich, 2019
Such a meeting actually already exists. The OpenSky Network holds its annual
symposium each year in Europe. Take a look at the topics covered – it looks very
similar to what we could expect here: data fusion, TCAS events, go-arounds.
As we know, our meeting this week is unique in the world. The model of protection
and prohibition of disclosure has grown Infoshare from a few dozen participants to
well over 1000. I think we would all agree that it has been a success story.
However, let’s look into the future, given the tsunami of open-source data looming on
the horizon.
What could all this mean for us at Infoshare? We are present here today with the
assurance that information shared stays in the room and is not shared beyond its
walls. The Rules of the Road as stated at the beginning of the day today.
The takeaway? ADS-B isn’t just a niche topic shared only among aviation hobbyists
on web boards. Quite the contrary: it has become a formalized industry with
symposiums and data sharing, much like what we will be doing this week.
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However, there is one glaring difference: We are afforded protection from disclosure,
punitive action, and enforcement action because of our regulations, written
agreements, and the common understanding of a just culture. This foundation leads
to an overall safety culture, and consequently our commendable safety record. If
these protections didn’t exist, do you think we would be willing to sit here today and
candidly discuss what we will this week?
We work hard to use the systems in place to validate data; what’s the qualification of
the person passing judgement? The louder voice becomes the most followed. Blurs,
misshapes and skews the perspective of the public.
We have a social contract in place between ATC and pilots; in the OpenSky world, we
don’ have a “contract” in the same sense. It makes it “anything goes” when only one
source of data is used for analysis, devoid of any validation from other internal
sources. ADS-B data bandied about can lead us to pick an airline to fly on because of
a marketing tool.
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Thank you!

In the sprit of being in St. Louis this week, we might ask if the issues we have
presented bear a similarity to Charles Lindberg’s historic flight on a May morning, 95
years ago. Lindbergh was relying on the technology and framework that had
advanced aviation up to that point. 24 years had passed between the Wright
Brothers’ first flight and his – remarkably, about the same time we have had in
aviation safety since the Advisory Circulars for our voluntary safety programs were
written.
As Lindbergh rolled down a muddy Roosevelt field, surely he must have felt both fear
and tremendous excitement at the same time. He was relying on a system that had
been rapidly developed over previous decades, but applied in a new way. Similarly,
our open-source data capabilities have rapidly entered the aviation domain. We are
breaking out of ground effect and setting course over a landscape that is unknown,
with huge consequences for the aviation safety industry.
Lindbergh succeeded largely because of the collaborative effort he led in getting his
initiative financially supported and physically built. In the same respect, use of flight
data and ramifications for the safety industry will best be solved in the same
collaborative effort. No doubt, data protection practices are different around the
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world. Yet, we are all one when it comes to safety.
We must ask: Should we face this next challenge as a single-pilot barnstormer, or as a
community of experts who recognize that the data protections and practices present
in U.S. aviation have likely contributed to our astonishingly safe aviation record? Will
we be the group of people you see above, coming together for the common good?
We want to stir the pot a bit and leave you thinking about the issue. There are
certainly more questions than answers. Thank you for your attention.
Presented by:
Eric Carter & James Norman
Infoshare • St. Louis • 2022
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